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Abstract 
Reserve requirements is viewed as very important instrument of the 
monetary policy, with the help of which Central Bank can influence at 
money supply and credit creation. At the same time this instrument 
imposes implicit tax on financial institutions, which are subject to this 
regulation. Reserve requirements in Ukraine stay at quite high level and 
the topic of this paper is analysis of such implicit taxation, its impact on 
economy and possible path of reforms in Ukraine. We argue that faced wit 
high reserve requirements and, as a consequence, diminishing revenues, 
commercial banks will try to pass as much costs as they can to their 
clients, widening interest rate spread. Eventual effect of high reserve 
requirements would be lower deposit rate, higher loan rate, less 
intermediation and aggregate investment that finally can lead to drop in 
output. In this paper we develop formal model of implicit taxation and 
provide empirical analysis, roughly estimating cost of reserve requirements 
for Ukrainian banking sector, which comes to almost 1 UAH bn per year. 
Further, we discuss policy issues and possibility of reducing reserve 
requirements and come to the conclusion that in Ukraine gradual decrease 
of required reserves is possible and indeed needed. 
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1. Introduction 
Monetary policy, in line with fiscal one is viewed as the major determinant 
of the sustainable economic development in any country. Success of this 
policy depends on the choice of long-run time consistent strategy, as well 
as on particular ways of how it is transmitted to the economic agents, i.e. 
on the so-called instruments of the monetary policy.  
Traditionally, there are three instruments of the Central Bank recognized: 
discount window, open market operations and reserve requirements. 
Facing specific conditions of the economy, Central Bank chooses one or 
another instruments or a combination of them, with which it can influence 
at the money market and than further at the stance of whole economy. In 
the process of this decision, Central Bank will in some cases tend to 
maximize its utility by choosing such way of conducting monetary policy, 
which can bring fast and easy-to-see results. Although they can be not 
favorable for economic growth in the long run, Central Bank will be less 
concerned about it, trying to comply with present wants of the 
government, despite that they can be time inconsistent.  
In other words, we can say that actually in this issue there are two sides of 
the medal: From one side, Central Bank chooses monetary instrument in 
accordance to how well it can implement its policy through it. From the 
other side, this choice can have its further impact on the economy, which 
in fact is not always anticipated or desirable. 
In this paper we will talk about one such aspect: reserve requirements as 
the instrument of the monetary policy and its implicit impact on the private 
sector, particularly its function as implicit tax on the banking sector. 
Historically, reserve requirements were viewed as the core of the monetary 
policy, but later its role significantly diminished. The main driving forces 
behind these changes were availability of the new, more efficient 
instruments of the monetary policy and the fact that reserve requirements 
put additional costs at the banking sector, lowering its profit and level of 
intermediation. Eventually, as was confirmed by empirical analyses, it can 
result in the diminishing investment and thus, drop in the production. In 
this research we will provide theoretical model of the implicit taxation of 
commercial banks by reserve requirements and further will concentrate on 
the use of this instrument in Ukraine, estimating implicit taxation and 
proposing some measures, which can possibly improve the situation.  
The paper will go as following: In Chapter 2 we will talk about such 
theoretical issues of reserve requirements as their functions and methods 
of implementing monetary policy with this instrument. The role of reserve 
requirements, their pro’s and contra’s and major reasons of world-wide 
diminishing use of reserve requirements as the instrument of Central Banks 
will be discussed in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 will develop formal model of the 
impact of reserve requirements on the private sector, emphasizing on the 
role of reserves as implicit tax on the banking sector. Chapter 5 will talk 
about reserve requirements in Ukraine, whether they are use is optimal 
and possible ways of reforms. Finally, in Chapter 6 we will summarize the 
main findings of the paper.  
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2. Theory of reserve requirements 
2.1. Functions of reserve requirements 
In many countries commercial banks are obliged to comply with reserve 
requirements: i.e. to hold certain fraction of their deposit liabilities at the 
account in the Central Bank or as the vault cash. 
There are four major functions of this instrument, importance of which was 
changing over time, as financial intermediation and methods of conducting 
monetary policy were developing too. 
Initially, reserve requirements were meant to ensure financial stability and 
reduce negative effects of bank runs. Holding certain amount of its deposits 
as reserves, commercial banks would be less exposed to the liquidity 
problems, caused by panic among depositors; besides that, reserve 
requirements can also serve as a kind of insurance fund in case of bank 
insolvency. Later on, importance of both of these tasks considerably 
diminished: open market operations were used much effectively for 
maintaining liquidity of the banking sector, while specially created deposit 
insurance funds undertook the role of the other task. 
Second, reserve requirements are used to control bank credit creation. 
That is, if Central Bank aims to reduce the volume of credits that banks 
give to the economic agents, it can achieve so by increasing reserve 
requirements, thus limiting funds, available for the intermediation; vice 
versa, lowering reserve rate can cause credit expansion. Although using 
this instrument for credit control is a very powerful tool, it may be too 
powerful and slow.  More of it, in countries with developed financial 
system, imposing reserve requirements on banks may put later in 
disadvantage with other financial institutions that also give credits, but are 
not subject to such regulations.   
Third function of the reserve requirements is control over money supply. 
Reserve requirements are important component of money multiplier and 
changing reserve ratio can pass through multiplier mechanism to affect 
broader money aggregates. Using reserve requirements for changing 
money supply is used relatively heavily in transition countries, where other 
instruments of the monetary policy are not always available.   
Finally, holding reserve requirements can reduce interest rate volatility. 
The point is that commercial banks are obliged to hold reserves not on the 
day-to-day basis, but averaging over certain period. Manager of the 
commercial bank, facing hikes and downs in the money market interest 
rates, can either withdraw funds from reserve account and put them into 
the money market, thus making a profit or put them back into reserve 
account, thus complying with requirements. In such way, the flow of funds 
becomes smoother, reducing volatility in the money market interest rate. 
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2.2. Mechanism of the monetary policy with reserve 
requirements  
Central Bank, conducting monetary policy via reserve requirements can 
introduce changes via three basic ways: the level of reserve ratio, the base 
of requirements (i.e. the types of liabilities, at which reserve requirements 
are imposed) and the method and period of reserve requirements 
calculation and placement. Below, we represent these ways in more 
details:  
2.2.1. The level of reserve requirements 
The mechanism of this tool is quite straightforward: changing the ratio of 
the reserves to deposits, Central Bank determines the level of liquid funds, 
available for financial intermediaries, and thus the level of money supply. 
This mechanism is the most powerful and can be used for control over 
money supply as well as credit creation.  
2.2.2. The base of reserves 
Here, the Central Bank differentiates the rate of reserves, according to: 
specific type of liability in the balance sheets, whether deposits are short 
term or long term, denominated in national or foreign currency. Changes in 
base of reserves are meant not as much for external alterations in the 
money supply, but more for structural adjustment within reserves.  
2.2.3. The method and period of reserve requirements calculation 
and placement  
Complying with reserve requirements, commercial banks have to hold a 
fraction of deposits according to calculated amount and the period of 
required reserves calculation and actual placement of funds into Central 
Bank account can differ. There are four principal methods of reserve 
calculation and placement: overlapping, semi-overlapping, successive and 
non-overlapping (see Table 1).   
 
Table 1. Methods of required reserves calculation and placement  
 Overlapping   Semi-
overlapping 
 
  
Period of 
calculation 
      
       
Period of 
placement 
      
 
 Successive   Non-
overlapping 
  
Period of 
calculation 
      
       
Period of 
placement 
      
Source: National Bank of Hungary 
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The larger lag between period of calculation and placement, the more 
freedom commercial banks have in planning their liquidity management, 
but at the same time changes in the reserve requirements will take longer 
time to be transmitted, so the Central Bank will have less flexibility while 
conducting monetary policy. 
Besides that, Central Bank can affect banks’ liquidity by changing the very 
size of period, within which commercial banks have to meet reserve 
requirements. In doing so, it can set this period from one day to month or 
more. Such, when economy experiences inflationary pressure, Central 
Bank may want to have tight control over money supply, then it can oblige 
banks to comply with reserve requirements on the daily basis; if monetary 
easing is desired, commercial banks can be allowed to meet reserves 
requirements on the average of the longer period. 
3. The role of reserve requirements nowadays 
The next question, which we would like to consider, is what the role of 
reserve requirements in the modern monetary policy.  Traditionally, in 
many ways it has been a key instrument of the Central Banks and they 
tended to rely on it heavily, determining the money supply or credit 
creation. Lately, especially during last decade, the role of the reserve 
requirements considerably diminished. Table 2 presents legal reserve 
requirements in several selected countries.   
 
Table2. Legal reserve requirements, % 
United States 3.0-10.0 
Canada 0.0 
EU 0.0-2.0 
UK 0.35 
Switzerland 0.0 
Japan 0.05-1.2 
New Zealand 0.0 
Czech Republic 2.0 
Poland 4.5 
Hungary 6.0 
Moldova 8.0 
Bulgaria 11.0 
Russia 7.0-10.0 
Ukraine 9.0-15.0 
Source: Central Banks of according countries 
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Such countries, as Canada, UK, Switzerland, New Zealand draw their 
reserve requirements to zero, United States consider this measure as well; 
European Central Bank sets it at pretty low level – from 0% to 2% of 
deposits and this ratio has to be adopted by members of EU as well as by 
candidate countries in CEE region; many other countries tend to decrease 
reserve ratio as well. 
Moreover, members of European System of Central Banks and some other 
accessing countries (Hungary for example) pay interest rate on the 
holdings of reserve requirements over maintenance period (see Box 1). 
 
 
In order to explain the rational behind these changes, lets first consider 
what benefits and costs for the economy reserve requirements have. 
The main advantages of reserve requirements are following:  
 It is easy to implement and does not require sophisticated structure of 
financial market; actually it was important driving force behind 
widespread use of this instrument in transition economies.  
 Alterations in reserve requirements have very powerful effect and 
usually just a tiny change is required. 
 Reserve requirements can be a source of funds for the public sector of 
economy. 
Disadvantages: 
a) The benefit of using reserve requirements can in fact turn into the 
cost: as we stated above, small changes have very large effect on 
money supply, but this effect can be (and often actually is) too big 
comparing to the target. Thus, the reserve requirements should be 
used just in cases when considerable changes in the money stock 
Box 1. Calculation of the remuneration of holding of required reserves in 
European System of Central Banks 
 
The holdings of required reserves is remunerated according to the following formula: 
 
360
1001

 


n
i t
tt
t
n
MRi
nRR
R  
 
Where: 
tR  = remuneration to be paid on holdings of required reserves for the                      
maintenance period t  
tRR  = holdings of required reserves for the maintenance period t  
tn  = number of calendar days in the maintenance period t  
i  = i th calendar day of the maintenance period t  
MRi  = marginal interest rate of the most recent main refinancing operations 
spanning calendar day i  
Source: European Central Bank 
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are needed and definitely do not suit for fine-tuning of the monetary 
policy.  
b) Frequent changes in reserve requirement may cause higher 
uncertainty for banks and their liquidity management will be 
embarrassed; 
c) Imposing reserve requirements at the level, higher than commercial 
banks tend to hold naturally, is in fact an implicit taxation of these 
financial institutions. That is, obliged to hold high reserve 
requirements, banks will have less liquidity and fewer opportunities 
to lend that will likely diminish banks profit.  
d) Suffering from high reserve requirements, commercial banks will try 
to pass as much costs as they can on their clients. Since agents of 
public sector usually have other sources of funding, the costs will be 
passed to the private sector, in first turn to small borrowers and 
households. Commercial banks will try to make up their diminishing 
profits by widening the spread of interest rates, lowering deposit 
rate and increasing loan rate, at that, the level of intermediation will 
decrease and eventually this may have negative effect for the 
performance of whole economy. In fact, reserve requirements will 
transfer income from private sector to public sector. 
e) Obliging commercial banks to comply with reserve requirements can 
actually discriminate them against 1) other financial institutions in 
the country, which do not have to meet this regulation and 2) 
financial intermediaries in other countries, where such regulations 
are lower.  
f) As financial institutions develop further and use new modern 
financial instruments, they tend to have more possibilities for 
reserve avoidance, either transforming deposits, which are subject 
to reserve requirements into other forms of liabilities or holding 
funds in foreign branches, where reserve ratio is less. Thus, the 
effectiveness of reserve requirements diminishes. 
Summarizing and taking to the account experience of Central Banks, we 
can determine two major reasons of why reserve requirements became 
less in use: 
First of all, it was caused by development of the monetary policy 
mechanism. Reserve requirements might be good for conducting policy in 
transition countries, where approximate changes can be accepted, but it is 
not recommended for accurate influence at the economy. Hence, Central 
Banks tend to rely now on other instruments, at the first place on open 
market operations.  
Second, very important motive, is the fact that reserve requirements put 
substantial costs on the banking sector and further, these costs are 
transmitted to the rest of the economy, resulting in welfare losses of the 
private sector.  
While first reason was necessary condition for changing use of the reserve 
requirements (i.e. without other developed monetary instruments, at the 
first place open market operations, it would not be possible to diminish role 
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of reserve requirements), the second issue, cost for the private sector, in 
many ways was the driving force for such reforms.  
Our paper is aimed at the analysis of this topic and in the next section we 
will develop formal model of the reserve requirements as the implicit tax 
on commercial banks and its impact on private sector. 
4. Impact of reserve requirements on private 
sector 
4.1. Literature review 
In this section we would like to overview some papers, which talk about 
cost side of reserve requirements. 
Kuprianov (1997) discuses explicit and implicit taxes on financial system 
and makes stress on the reserve requirements as implicit tax. First, he 
builds theoretical model where the cost for the banks of complying with 
reserve requirements is shown; at that, the distinction between small and 
big banks is made. Then, the author continues analysis by looking at how 
these costs are transmitted to the clients of the banks. The second part of 
the paper is devoted to empirical test of the model for the U.S. data. 
Concluding, Kuprianov argues that although required reserves were 
diminishing in U.S. (both due to administrative decrease in the reserve rate 
and avoidance from banks) and it had its positive effect for intermediation, 
the further reforms and easing of requirements are needed.   
Repullo (1992) talks about such ways of financing budget deficits, as 
seigniorage and implicit taxation, developing a model of financial sector 
and estimating implicit tax for Portugal and Spain. The analyses are done 
for the period of political instability and increased budget expenditures in 
late 1970’s – early 1980’s. Author shows that although financing budget 
deficit by seigniorage and simultaneously increasing reserve requirements 
helped government at the moment, it had quite straight negative 
consequence for the banking sector and further, for the private sector. 
Moreover, high reserve requirements put banks of those countries in 
disadvantage with other countries, first of all EU. 
Loungani and Rush (1995) study the effect of changes in reserve 
requirements on investment and GNP. They argue that facing higher 
reserve requirements, not only the profitability of commercial banks will go 
down, but the level of intermediation will decrease as well. Further, it will 
have negative impact on real activity, particularly on aggregate 
investment. Eventually, high reserve requirements will result in drop of 
production in economy. After building formal model, they conduct empirical 
analysis for United States. 
Although these authors talk about reserve requirements as implicit tax for 
financial system, their discussion is mixed with other economic issues, and 
the models are not designed specifically to show the effect of reserves. In 
our paper we are intended to build the model, which would explicitly show 
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the mechanism of reserve requirements impact on the intermediation and 
its further consequence on the private sector.       
4.2. A model of the banking sector 
Let’s consider a simple partial equilibrium model with four agents of 
economy: commercial banks, Central Bank, households and firms. The 
characteristics of agents are following: 
(i) Central Bank is a main regulating body of the monetary policy. It can 
affect cost of funds, using several instruments, usually a mixture of them. 
In this model we concentrate on the reserve requirements and introduce 
government bonds, keeping other instruments fixed.     
(ii) Commercial banks are monopolies that set interest rates on deposits 
and credits. Their function is to collect deposits from the population and 
allocate them as credits to the real economy. There is only one kind of 
deposit and one kind of loan and banks meet entire market for them. 
Besides that, commercial banks hold government bonds, which we denote 
as BB  here. Finally, banks have to comply with reserve requirements, 
keeping the share of deposits  at the Central Bank. Thus, the balance 
sheet of the representative bank is following: 
EDRRBBL                                                      (1) 
where L  represents loans, BB  - government bonds, RR  is a part of 
deposits, which is hold to comply with reserves requirements, D  is 
deposits and E  is bank’s equity, which is exogenous here. 
Banks collect deposits and their demand function is given by  
 

 ikDD                                                                     (2) 
where banks demand on deposits negatively depends on the interest rate 
for them. 
Further, allocating funds, banks have loan supply function represented by 
following: 
   

1DifLS                                                          (3) 
where loan supply is a positive function of the interest rates and  1D  
represents funds, available for crediting after fulfilling reserve 
requirements. 
(iii) Households have deposit supply, which positively depends on the 
deposit interest rate and negatively on bond rate: 








BD
S iihD ,                                                               (4)    
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Bond demand function is represented as 








BD
D iiBB ,  
increasing at bond rate and decreasing at deposit rate. 
(iv) Firms demand credits from the banks according to the following 
function:  
 

 yigLD ,                                                                   (5) 
which negatively depends on the interest rates and positively depends on 
their income. 
Now lets turn to the banking sector. In their day-to-day operations, banks 
receive income from giving credits to the economy and the revenue is 
equal to the level of loans times the interest rate on them, LiL  . At the 
same time, cost of operations consists of two parts: 1) amount of money, 
banks have to pay for attracted deposits DiD  and 2) operational costs, 
which is denoted as Z and assumed to be fixed. So, the profit equation for 
the banking sector will be given by  
ZDiLi DL                                                            (6) 
Following Klein (1971), the independence between loan and deposit rates is 
allowed by introducing bond rate. In this case equation (7) represents 
marginal revenue on loans (LHS), which is equal to opportunity cost (RHS).  
  BLL ii  11     
B
L
L
L ii 




 

 1
                                                                                   
(7) 
Transforming, we get following equation for equilibrium loan rate:  
B
L
L
L ii 







1

                                                                                 (7a) 
Where 







LLL i is elasticity of demand for loans, which negatively 
depends on interest rate for credits.  
Similarly, equation (8) shows equality of marginal cost of deposits and 
their marginal return. 
    BDD ii    11 1  
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  B
D
D
D ii 







 
1
1
                                                                        (8) 
The equilibrium loan rate is given in equation (8a): 
  B
D
D
D ii 









 1
1
                                                                      (8a) 
Here 







BDDD ii ,  is elasticity of demand for deposits; the function is 
positive with respect to interest rate on deposits and negative with respect 
to bond rate. 
Having first order conditions, now we proceed to the equilibrium equation 
for the government bonds. In (9) the left side of the equation is the sum of 
household demand for bonds and demand from commercial banks, the 
right side is the supply of bonds. 
  BBBiiB BD ,                                                                             (9) 
Reorganizing commercial banks balance sheet in terms of demand for 
bonds and substituting to the equation (10), we get following:  
        BEiLiiDiiB LBDBD  ,1,                                             (10) 
Now, (7a), (8a) and (10) form a system of equations. Totally differentiating 
it subject to the ratio of reserve requirements , we can find effect of 
reserve requirements on the loan, deposit and bond rates. 
The first results are shown at the following equation:  
  0, 



































D
D
B
B
D
D
B
D
D
D
B
BL
BD
i
Di
i
Di
i
Di
i
Di
i
Bi
i
BiLi
iiD





    
(11) 
Rearranging terms, we get: 
  0, 





































DDD
D
BBB
B
L
L
BD
i
D
i
D
i
Bi
i
D
i
D
i
Bi
i
Li
iiD 



    
(12)                           
Further, 0


Li
L , since amount of loans demanded negatively depends on 
interest rate for them; level of deposits, supplied by households is higher, 
the higher deposit rate is, 0


Di
D ; demand on bonds has positive relation 
with the bond rate: 0


Bi
B ; finally, 0


Di
B  and 0


Bi
D  since deposits 
and bonds are considered as substitutes.  
Using this information we can derive signs for the interest rate 
expressions: 
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0



Li
                                                                                           (13) 
0



Di
                                                                                           (14) 
0



Bi
                                                                                           (15) 
As we can see, higher reserve requirements make loan, deposit and bond 
rates to increase. 
The intuition of the process can be shown by following explanation:  
As we know, all deposits can be divided into those that has to be held in 
the cash to comply with reserve requirements, D  and those, available for 
the crediting,  1D . So, decomposing deposits in the profit equation, 
we get: 
  ZDiDiLi DDL  1                                
Since banks can loan only at the level they have collected funds in the form 
of deposits and there is no other source of funds (banks own funds, E , are 
not important here), the level of loans, L  is equal to the amount of 
deposits  1D , left after meeting reserve requirements, i.e. 
  1DL . Rearranging terms in the profit equations, we come to the 
following:  
 
    ZDiDii
ZDiLii
DDL
DDL




1
                                       
Here, bank’s revenue is equal to the level of loans times the spread 
between the interest rates on loans and deposits. The costs are coming 
from holding a fraction of deposits, at which banks have to pay interest Di , 
as zero interest rate reserve requirements and from operational expenses.  
This equation shows us the main sources of revenues and expenditures of 
the banking sector and, what is important for our topic of interest, the 
effect of reserve requirements on the banks performance.  
Let’s consider the increase in the norm of reserve requirements  . Now 
banks have to hold larger share of deposits, at which they have to pay 
interest, in the form of non-earning reserves; more of it, banks will have 
fewer funds, available for lending operations, as  1D  diminishes. 
Taking into account higher costs and fewer possibilities of lending, bank’s 
profits  will start to go down and as can be seen from equation (8), the 
solution for banks would be to increase the spread of interest rates. Thus, 
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banks will decrease interest paid on deposits Di and increase lending rate 
Li .  
Following this decision, the supply of deposits will be less, since consumers 
supply of deposits 
SD  (equation 4) directly depends on the interest rate. 
Firms, on their turn will demand fewer loans, in accordance with firm’s loan 
demand function 
DL  (equation 5), which has inverse relation with the 
interest rate. The magnitude of the changes in deposits and loans depends 
on the corresponding elasticities. 
As the result of increase in the reserve requirements, we will have higher 
lending rate, lower deposit rate, higher costs for the banking sector and 
less intermediation in the economy. 
The summary of the mechanism, described above, can be represented as 
the following:  
   tionIntermediaDLiiiiprofitBanksLiquidityRR DLDL_
 
Also it is useful to represent the process in the graphical way. Figure 1 
shows the level of intermediation in the economy and corresponding 
interest rates for the credits and deposits.  
 
Figure 1. Impact of reserve requirements on interest rates and intermedaition 
 
Here, loan demand is a function, described above:  yigLD , .  It is 
downward sloping, since firms demand fewer credits if interest rate for 
them ( Li ) becomes higher. Deposit supply corresponds to the function 
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 yihD S ,  and is upward sloping, i.e. households are willing to deposit 
more if they get higher interests rate Di . For the purpose of not 
overloading model and keeping it simple but demonstrative, we represent 
deposits as net of reserve requirements, so that loan demand can meet 
deposit supply at one point. The spread between interest rates on loans 
and deposits  DL ii   represents mark-up of the banks, which covers 
certain profit target and costs, coming from various sources, including 
reserve requirements.  
Initial level of intermediation is given at point 
oInt ; corresponding interest 
rates are 
0
Di  for deposits and 
0
Li  for loans. Then, according to the 
mechanism, described above, if Central Bank decides to increase the level 
of reserve requirements, banks will have less liquidity and will react by 
widening interest rate spread: interest paid on deposits will come down to 
1
Di , while interest for loans will go up to 
1
Li . Economy will react by 
providing fewer deposits and demanding fewer loans, thus, the level of the 
intermediation will go down to 
1Int .  
Thus, the new equilibrium will have higher loan interest rate 
1
Li , lower 
deposit rate 
1
Di  and less deposits supplied and loans demanded, 
1Int . 
4.3. Implicit taxation of banks 
Direct cost for the banks, coming from reserve requirements can be seen 
quite easily: banks attract deposits from households, paying interest rate 
on them, defined here as Di . Then, complying with the reserve 
requirements, banks have to hold in the Central Bank a fraction of deposits 
D  in the form of zero interest rate reserves. Thus, in other words, 
commercial banks buy funds from households and give them for free to the 
Central Bank; the cost would be following: 
Direct cost DiD                                                        (9) 
Then, having a certain amount of funds frozen at the Central Bank account, 
commercial banks cannot use them in their operations, in our case – to 
give credits to the real economy. So, the opportunity cost is defined as 
forgiven revenue from not providing loans for economy and charging 
interest rate on them:   
Opportunity cost = DiL                                             (10) 
Total cost of holding reserve requirements is just a sum of direct and 
opportunity costs, described above: 
Total cost =    DiiDiDi LDLD                      (11) 
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In order to proceed from cost to the implicit taxation, we must note that 
commercial banks naturally tend to hold a certain amount of deposits in 
the Central Bank, using it for transactions with government and other 
purposes. If we denote this natural reserve rate as 
* , than a rate, higher 
than this would indicate implicit taxation of banks. Converting equation 11, 
we get the following formula, which shows us implicit taxation from holding 
excess reserve requirements:   
Implicit tax =    *  Dii LD                                   (12) 
4.4. Cost for the economy 
Now, as we have got first results for the consequences of the increase in 
reserve requirements, let’s try to estimate its impact on the economy more 
deeply.  
First, lets see what economic theory has to say about it. For the public 
sector, reserve requirements are beneficial and serve as a form of 
seigniorage. But money cannot come from nowhere, and actually reserve 
requirements reallocate income from private sector to public sector and 
Figure 2 shows us welfare impact of holding higher reserves on private 
sector.  
Here, firms have welfare losses since now they have to pay higher interest 
rate 
1
Li  for the credits. It can be represented by the area of the upper 
shaded rectangle, which is equal to the increase in the interest rates 
 01 LL ii   times the volume of credits, 1Int . Households lose, because they 
can get less revenue from providing deposits, as interest rate on them 
came down. Welfare loss is shown by lower shaded rectangle and is equal 
1Int  0Int  
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to the decrease in the interest rate  10 DD ii   times the level of deposits.  
Shaded rectangular at the left shows welfare losses of the commercial 
banks. 
As we can see, increased reserve requirements can bring welfare losses to 
all three private agents in our model: firms, households and commercial 
banks. But before making conclusions from this part of the paper, we 
should recall that this is static partial equilibrium analysis and it gives us 
just the most evident consequences. In reality, the magnitude of 
alterations would be much higher: making economic agents worse off and 
depressing intermediation in the economy will have its further negative 
impact on investment pattern, technological innovations and in the 
dynamic situation may cause drop in GDP. Actually, Loungani and Rush 
(1995) empirically tested this hypothesis for United States and found out 
that higher reserve requirements have adverse effect on investment and 
output. Of course, in order to estimate this effect, we have to build rather 
complicated general equilibrium model, which would incorporate various 
links between all agents of the economy. In this paper we do not conduct 
such research and focus instead on partial equilibrium analysis, looking 
first of all at the banking sector.       
5. Reserve requirements in Ukraine 
5.1. History and role of reserve requirements in Ukraine 
Reserve requirements in Ukraine were first implemented in 1989, during 
Soviet Union time yet. For this purpose State Bank of USSR issued decree 
about creation of the Fund for regulation of the credit resources, according 
to which commercial banks had to hold a certain amount of attracted funds 
at the special account. Since its foundation 1991, National Bank of Ukraine 
started to use the norm of reserve requirements for conducting its 
monetary policy, changing it in accordance with the stance of economy 
(Table 3 shows the level of reserve requirements in 1992 through 2000). 
 
Table 3. The level of reserve requirements in Ukraine in 1992 - 2000, % 
Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Level 13 25 15 15 15 15 16,5 17 15 
 Source: NBU Bulletin 
In doing so, reserve requirements were viewed as very important 
instrument of the National Bank policy. The basic cause for it was the fact 
that Ukraine had to start building its financial system from the very 
beginning, without previous experience of conducting monetary policy or 
commercial banks operations. In these circumstances, as in many other 
transition countries, reserve requirements were attractive for the Central 
Bank due to its effectiveness and relative simplicity of use. Thus, reserve 
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requirements were used quite intensively during financial crises in 1997, 
1998 and 1999 for keeping money supply under control and not allowing 
for hyperinflation. In this process, the NBU was changing the rate of 
reserve requirements – fluctuating between 15% and 17%, the type of 
liabilities, which were matter for reserves, as well as the period for 
complying with requirements - from one day to the month.     
Recently, reserve requirements in Ukraine were somewhat liberalized and 
in year 2001 are held at the level from 9% to 15% and differentiated 
according to the term and type of liability and currency of denomination 
(see Table 4). Besides that, the control over compliance with reserve 
requirements from May 2001 is carried out once a month, comparing to 
earlier two-week period.  
 
Table 4. The level of reserve requirements in Ukraine in 2001, % 
Source Type of deposit Short-term Long-term 
Juridical persons 
National currency 14 11 
Foreign currency 14 11 
Natural persons 
National currency 12 9 
Foreign currency 13 13 
Rest 15 
Source: NBU 
 
Although reserve requirements were quite useful instrument for conducting 
monetary policy during last decade and importance of it should not be 
underestimated and also some liberalization has taken place, the rate of 
reserve requirement in Ukraine still stay at the high level, which has 
negative effect on the economy. 
5.2. Estimation of the cost of reserve requirements for 
private sector in Ukraine 
In this section we will try to estimate, although quite roughly, the cost of 
reserve requirements for the private sector and commercial banks in 
Ukraine. Before doing it, we must note that these calculations are 
approximate and are not intended to give precise bookkeeping number, but 
instead the very idea of the cost, which could be used for further analyses. 
At the present, the amount of funds, which commercial banks hold as 
reserves at the National Bank of Ukraine account or vault cash is equal to 
UAH 2500 m. Average deposit interest rate is taken as 8%, average loan 
rate is 30% per annum.  
Then, turning to the formulas, described in section 4.2., we can estimate 
that direct cost of holding non-earning reserves, for which commercial 
banks have to pay 8 % deposit rate is equal to: 
Direct cost 200250008.0  DiD
*                                                    
                                           
*
 Actually, the average deposit rate does not count in deposits, at which interest 
rate is not provided, thus this number should be somewhat less.  
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That is, Ukrainian commercial banks have to pay UAH 200 m as the 
interest rate on deposits, which they freeze in the Central Bank. In other 
words, commercial banks pay UAH 200 m for the right to collect deposits. 
The opportunity cost is calculated as forgiven revenue from not giving 
loans to the economy: 
Opportunity cost = 750250030.0  DiL                                             
The number UAH 750 m shows us the revenue, which commercial banks 
could earn by giving credits at the average interest rate of 30%, instead, 
funds that could be used for it are held as required reserves. 
The total cost is just the sum of the previous two and is equal to the UAH 
950 m:  
Total cost =     950250030.008.0  Dii LD                    
Thus, almost UAH 1 bn represents costs that commercial banks bear from 
holding reserve requirements. Talking about this issue, we should clearly 
define that this is not an accounting cost and it does not appear anywhere 
in the official financial reports. Instead, this represents money flows in the 
economic sense of this term, showing real costs that banks bear. 
As we can see, imposing high reserve requirements can bring quite 
significant costs for the banking sector. Of course, we should remember 
that the costs for commercial banks from complying with reserve 
requirements does not coincide with the implicit tax, which actually hurts 
banking sector, since banks voluntary hold some fraction of deposits as 
reserve for transactions with government or other purposes. Thus, in order 
to calculate implicit tax, we need to know the natural level of holding 
reserves * , which depends on the specific payment system in the 
country and other factors and cannot be easily and precisely estimated.  
Just giving a clue, making reserves twice less and bringing them to the 
average of around 6% (still quite a substantial number) would reduce 
banks costs by approximate UAH 500 m per year. Yet, this is not the end of 
the story, since decrease in reserve requirements would also mean that 
around UAH 1.25 bn will be freed for commercial banks operations and, as 
was stated in section 4.3., could potentially be used for crediting of the real 
sector, making investment grow and, thus, increasing production. 
5.3. Agenda for reforms 
Summing up the results of the partial analysis in our paper, we can see 
that reserve requirements, although appear to be powerful instrument of 
the monetary policy, do bring additional costs to the banking system and 
private sector. Central Banks in many countries, especially during last 
decades, became more concerned about this drawback and tend to change 
accents, relying less on reserve requirements than on other instruments of 
the monetary policy. Reducing costs of the private sector, Central Banks 
try to diminish the burden of reserve requirements by substantially 
lowering the rate of reserves (in some cases driving it to zero), constricting 
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types of liabilities, subject to regulations, or even by paying interest rate 
on the reserves. As the result, the stance of the commercial banks is eased 
and more intermediation is going in the economy.  
Although in the short run diminishing role of reserve requirements can 
make work of Central Bank more complicated, as it has to reconsider 
implementation of its instruments and assure that it still has reliable 
control over transmission of the monetary policy, over the longer period 
reforms will be beneficial for the economic growth. 
Very important point, which we should make clear, is that while Central 
Banks tend to make reserve rate less, it does not mean that they cannot 
use this instrument anymore. The main underlying idea here is that what is 
more important for controlling money supply by reserve requirements is 
not the absolute level of reserves, but relative changes. That is, if the 
Central Bank intends to shock money supply, using this instrument, it does 
so by changing the reserve rate; initial amount plays a secondary, although 
still significant role here.  
Of course we should not underestimate the absolute level too, since in 
many ways it determines the magnitude of the Central Bank influence on 
the economy. The higher that level, the easier Central Bank can control 
money supply and more confident it would be conducting monetary policy. 
As Freidman wrote about it, hypothetically Central Bank can put money 
supply under its complete control by setting reserve requirements at 100% 
of deposits, but in that case financial intermediaries will not be able to give 
credits (Mishkin 1999). In real economy Central Bank, concerned about 
sustainable growth, tries to choose the level of reserves that will enable 
Central Bank to use it as effective instrument of the monetary policy but at 
the same time will not be over pressing for financial intermediaries.  
The minimum level, at which Central Bank can set reserve requirements 
greatly depends on the development of the financial system and availability 
of other instruments of the monetary policy. Following these factors, in 
countries with more sophisticated financial markets and instruments of 
monetary policy, Central Bank can permit oneself driving reserve rate to 
really low level, but in less developed economies Central Bank set reserve 
rate at higher level, in such way securing more power for shocking 
economy.       
Now, as we considered general path of reforms in reserve requirements, 
lets turn to the situation in Ukraine. 
As was mentioned earlier, the level of reserve requirements in Ukraine 
stays at relatively high level, considerably higher then in developed 
economies and transition countries of Central Europe, and even higher than 
in neighboring Russia and Moldova. At the same time the spread between 
interest rates in Ukraine stays at one of the highest levels in European 
transition countries, while the depth of financial system is rather low (see 
Table 5). 
 20 
 
Table 5. Interest rate spread and depth of financial system in Eastern European 
countries, 1998
*
 
Country Interest rate spread, % Credits to GDP, % 
Czech Republic 5.5 79.8 
Slovak Republic 5.2 71.8 
Hungary 3.2 49.1 
Poland 5.6 36.9 
Slovenia 6.8 35.5 
Bulgaria 37.1 30.0 
Russia 15.3 25.9 
Belarus 16.2 17.7 
Ukraine 30.9 17.2 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, 1999         
According to our analysis, decrease in required reserves in Ukraine could 
mean reduction of the regulative costs for the banking sector and, as 
predict theory and experience of other countries, consequent decrease in 
the interest rate spread. Further, this would result in the expansion of 
aggregate investment and creation of necessary prerequisites for output 
growth. Actually, in year 2001, when quite substantial reforms of reserve 
requirements were undertaken, credits to the Ukrainian economy for the 
first four months grew by 22%, deposits – by 23.5% and at least part of 
this intermediation improvement can be attributed to the liberalization in 
reserves requirements.    
Moreover, decrease in reserve requirements will be positive in the sense of 
equalizing costs of commercial banks with other financial intermediaries, 
which are not subject to reserve requirements regulations. This would take 
off some relative benefits of “gray lenders” and promote inflow of capital in 
to the official economy. Besides that, Ukrainian commercial banks will be 
put into more competitive conditions with foreign financial markets. 
Thus, looking at the results of this partial analysis, the straightforward 
policy implication for Ukraine would be to bring reserve requirements 
down. But, this issue is not as simple as it seems and actually we cannot 
say right away that such decrease in reserve requirements will bring us 
positive changes, described above, without examining some further aspects 
of the question. 
First of all, Central Bank has to be sure that it will be able to conduct 
monetary policy in new conditions and has in its use other effective and 
reliable instruments. For Ukraine the biggest challenge in this issue lies in 
the development of open market operations and revival of T-bills market.  
The second warning is that decrease in reserve requirements actually 
creates new free money in the economy. Taking into account that for year 
                                           
*
 Although the data for Ukraine do not exactly coincide with the statistics of the 
NBU, we give it as reported by IMF for the purpose of comparative analysis 
with other countries.  
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2001 planed increase in the money base is UAH 2 bn, any significant 
change in the required reserves (which stay at the level of UAH 2.5 bn) can 
raise concerns about the stability of the national currency. Thus, the policy 
of liberalizing reserve requirements should be incorporated into the overall 
Central Bank strategy of money emission. Moreover, following the 
experience of EU states and some CEE countries, issuing long-term 
government bonds can neutralize this negative liquidity effect.       
The danger of greater interest rate volatility is another important issue. 
This problem is of more significance for the countries, which drive reserve 
ratio to zero or so, but if reserve requirements are held at the medium 
level, banks still will be able to use it as a buffer for smoothing interest rate 
at the money market. For Ukraine it is also important to promote 
development of the interbank market: properly functioning, it could as well 
help to avoid volatility of the interest rate.       
The next problem lies in the conflict between private and public interests: 
reduction in reserve requirements (under the stipulation that Central Bank 
takes this process into consideration while emitting money) would mean 
that government has less possibilities for direct money creation, thus, 
seigniorage revenues will fall as well. Here it should be noted that this 
issue is a matter of political will of the government to give up some easy 
money for the sake of long-term economic growth.  
The fifth question, which we should consider, is whether liberalization in 
reserve requirements can actually result in the expansion of credits to the 
economy. In the situation of strongly regulated financial markets and lack 
of developed legislative and institutional settings, commercial banks can 
accumulate considerable liquidity, but will not be able (or willing) to give 
sound credits to the real sector (that is actually the case in Ukraine). Thus, 
the Central Bank should not only ease the stance of commercial banks 
through reserve requirements, but also promote creation of favorable 
conditions through effective mechanisms of collateral and bankruptcy, law 
on credits, etc.      
Finally, as ratio of reserves to deposits diminishes, the need of reliable 
deposit insurance fund becomes more demanding. 
Now, turning to the idea of reforming reserve requirements in Ukraine and 
taking into account the warnings, discussed above, we can step to the 
question of how such changes of existing system can be exactly done.  
First of all, we should note that rapid decrease of reserve requirements is 
not desirable for any economy, since a) it creates new money, which can 
result in high inflation and b) Central Bank may not have enough time for 
adjustment of the monetary policy. Following this logic, Central Banks 
pursue gradual policy of driving down reserve requirements, extending it 
for several years. Thus, Central Bank of Canada authorized elimination of 
reserve requirements by Bank Act in 1991, while the process proceeded till 
mid 1994. Other countries, which also experienced substantial reforms of 
reserve requirements, such as UK and New Zealand, conducted it for 
several years as well. CEE accessing countries, which have to meet 
regulations of European System of Central Banks, all accept longstanding 
plans of decrease in reserve requirements. For such transition economy as 
Ukraine the issue of gradualism is especially important, since weak 
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financial sector and lack of effective alternative instruments of the NBU can 
turn sharp decrease of reserves into the volatility in financial markets and 
currency instability, thus this process should be securely extended for a 
middle-run period.   
Second issue concerns the target level of reserve requirements reforms. 
Although bringing reserves to the low level could give relief to the 
commercial banks, doing so is dangerous, since NBU will be confronted 
with difficulties of controlling money supply; hence, again, for the middle 
run term decreasing reserve to deposit ratio lower then 5-6% is most 
probably undesirable.     
Also there is one more possibility of easing costs of reserve requirements: 
government could pay interest rate on reserve holdings. Using ESCB 
methodology (see Box 1) and accepting NBU Lombard rate (25%) as a 
remunerate basis, it would turn into more then UAH 300 m per year. 
Taking into account difficulties with the budget execution, this option, 
unfortunately for the private sector, can be hardly called realistic.   
Summarizing this section of our analysis, we can state that reforms of 
reserve requirements system in Ukraine can lead to the relief of the now-
troubled banking sector, expansion of intermediation and eventually 
creation of favorable preconditions for economic growth. Such option as 
paying remuneration for the reserve holding probably is not feasible in 
current conditions, but reducing the ratio of reserves to deposits is 
completely possible. The indispensable terms for such reform should be 
clear strategy of reducing reserve ratio, which has to take into account the 
warnings we mentioned above, as well as other measures, directed at the 
development of the banking sector in Ukraine. The proposed reform for the 
middle-run period is reducing reserve ratio to the 5-6 percent average 
within next 2 or 3 years. This speed of changes and target level of reserves 
should promote financial intermediation and at the same time will allow 
NBU to be confident about conducting monetary policy and controlling 
money supply.    
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we were talking about such instrument of the monetary policy 
as reserve requirements and its impact on private sector. The main idea of 
the analysis is that although reserves is a suitable tool for the Central 
Bank, it imposes additional burden to the commercial banks and, further, 
to other agents of economy. We argue that commercial banks will try to 
pass costs of holding reserves to their clients, widening interest rate. 
Eventually this process will come to the distortion in aggregate investment 
and will have adverse effect on output.  
Estimated cost of holding reserve requirements for Ukrainian commercial 
banks roughly total to UAH 1 bn. Taking into account that presently 
financial system in Ukraine is pretty thin and interest rate spread, 
reflecting various bank costs, is large, liberalizing reserve requirements 
could be one of the facilitating factors, creating favorable conditions for 
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development of the banking sector and promoting crediting of the real 
economy.   
According to our analysis, the reforms of the reserve requirements can be 
done without making pressure for the price stability or compromising 
ability of NBU to conduct monetary policy. We propose accepting program 
of gradually reducing reserve requirements to 5-6% average within next 2 
or 3 years. The process of reserve reforms should be compulsory 
incorporated into fiscal and monetary policy and coordinated within the 
government bodies. The very important point here is that NBU should 
accept money emission, coming from reserve reduction into its general 
plan of creating money, avoiding thus inflationary pressure. In such way 
financial system will experience relief of the regulatory burden and the 
benefits will be spread over wider range of economic agents, servicing for 
long-term economic growth. NBU, in its turn will still be able to conduct 
monetary policy and have control over money supply via this instrument.      
In year 2001 reserve requirements underwent some reforms in Ukraine, 
which had its positive impact on financial intermediation. The success of 
further changes greatly depends on the understanding of importance of 
financial sector for long-term economic growth and commitment to pursue 
time consistent policy, giving up some easy-to-achieve measures for the 
sake of real reforms. 
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